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Collective Responsibility and the Individual 
  
 
1. Consider the recent Israeli assault on Gaza.  On December 27, 2008, Israel 
attacked the Gaza Strip with heavy aerial bombardment, and then later with a ground 
attack, allegedly to stop rocket attacks launched by Hamas, the governing authority in 
Gaza.  The attack lasted about three weeks and killed about 1400 Palestinians, many of 
them (if not most of them, depending on your source), civilians.  Let’s grant (what I don’t 
actually believe1), that Israel’s aim was to stop the rocket fire from Gaza that had been 
threatening its citizens.  Assuming this aim, one would naturally look to just war theory 
to evaluate the moral propriety of bombing heavily populated areas in response to the 
threat.  Indeed, in a recent article Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer (2009) do just 
that.  They conclude their article with this principle: “Conduct your war in the presence 
of noncombatants on the other side with the same care as if your citizens were the 
noncombatants” (22). 
 Now, I think their argument is unassailable.  I also think it’s clear that the 
bombing of Gaza, along with the strategic bombing of Germany and Japan during 
WWII, and most of the attacks that kill civilians in modern warfare, do not pass their test.  
I can’t imagine any American or Israeli agreeing to the obliteration of one of their cities 
  
                                                                                                                                                            
or neighborhoods, or even that of a third party, in order to further the strategic interests - 
even quite legitimate ones - that were at stake in most of these cases.  So why are so 
many people sanguine about the casualties of large numbers of non-combatants, 
despite the clear violation of just war principles involved; principles that many of those 
same people would endorse if asked?   
 Here I am perhaps speculating, but it seems to me that underlying the common 
acceptance of such tactics is the idea that our enemy is an entire people, a collective, 
and therefore all members of that collective are in some sense appropriate targets of 
violence or other retributive action.  At any rate, I want to consider whether taking this 
stance is justifiable, and, if not, what implications rejecting it has for certain other 
common tactics of political action that I, along with many others, consider justifiable.  In 
particular, since imposing economic sanctions to pressure a government unavoidably 
causes harms to the individual citizens of the nation in question, must one justify the 
harms so caused by appeal to a notion of collective responsibility? 
2. There are a lot of different, and overlapping notions of collective responsibility in 
the literature, applied to a wide variety of situations.2  Whether one is dealing with a 
club, a corporation, an ethnic group, or a nation clearly makes a difference.  Theorists 
also differ concerning the nature of the relationship among individual members required 
in order for a genuine collective to exist, as well as the locus of the responsibility 
ascribed on the basis of the collective’s actions.  My concern here is with national 
 
1For arguments that Israeli aims were not primarily to protect its citizens, see Henry 
Siegman (2009). 
  
                                                                                                                                                            
collectives, in the sense of peoples, where what constitutes a people is often 
determined by the boundaries of a state but it needn’t be.  So in my sense Americans, 
the French, and the Chinese are peoples, but so are Palestinians, Jews, and Kurds (but 
not Catholics, or, probably, Muslims).  I don’t have anything like a theory of what makes 
a collection of individuals into a people, but some relevant features will come out as we 
proceed.  For now I assume an intuitive grasp of what I have in mind. 
 As I said above, there are a lot of different views on the question of collective 
responsibility, and different parameters along which views differ.   One parameter is the 
kind of relation required of individuals in order for them to constitute a genuine 
collective.  On one end of the spectrum is what one might call the “biblical” view, 
captured in the passage, “for I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity 
of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate 
me” (Exodus 20:5, King James). When God commands the Israelites to kill every 
Amalekite, or Simeon and Levi kill every male resident of the city of Shechem because 
its prince raped their sister, we see this notion at work.  On this view, one is born into a 
collective and is responsible, to the point of liability to capital punishment, for that 
collective’s actions.  Nowadays we consider this morally repugnant, a kind of racism.  I 
mention this conception of collective responsibility only to indicate that it constitutes one 
end of a spectrum linking individual responsibility to that of the collective.3   
 
2The collections in May and Hoffman (1991) and French and Wettstein (2006) cover the 
territory fairly well. 
3Though few would explicitly avow this version of collective responsibility, I do think it 
exerts at least a subliminal influence on our thinking, especially in times of inter-group conflict, 
  
                                                                                                                                                            
 In the current literature no one thinks mere birth alone is sufficient to make an 
individual a member of a particular collective.  Rather, at least some feature under the 
person’s control must be present.  For some, collectives are formed out of “shared 
intentions,” for others it’s a “joint commitment,” and yet for others it’s a notion of 
“solidarity,”4  The common core here is that collectives involve both identification as a 
member on the part of the individuals comprising it, as well as some sense of common 
purpose, a sense of working together for common goals and common welfare.   
 It seems to me that nations, or peoples, plausibly meet the criterion of 
commonality of purpose, interest, and identification that is the common core in the views 
just mentioned.  While an entire people rarely, if ever, acts out of a shared intention in 
the way that, say, a gang robbing a bank does, or a basketball team executing a fast 
break does, the somewhat weaker requirements of solidarity, common interests, and 
joint commitment do seem to be met, at least in most cases.  What is crucial, however, 
and what largely distinguishes this notion of a collective from what I called the “biblical” 
one, is that a person has the choice whether to identify, and thus belong, to any 
particular collective.  Being born American, a Jew, or a Kurd doesn’t automatically make 
one a member of the relevant collective.  One can renounce one’s American citizenship 
and refuse to consider oneself Jewish or Kurdish.5 
 
and perhaps this influence is at least partly responsible for the widespread acceptance of violence 
against civilians that persists to this day. 
4For what constitutes a “shared intention,” see Bratman (2006) and references cited there.  
Gilbert (2006) employs the notion of a “joint commitment,” and Feinberg (1991) talks of 
“solidarity.” 
5Of course ability to separate from the collective is not the only difference between the 
biblical view and current conceptions.  How much liability to harm is engendered by one’s 
  
                                                                                                                                                            
 Let’s suppose we can treat nations/peoples as genuine collectives.  There is still 
a gap from acknowledging the category of a collective in this way to attributing 
responsibility to a collective.  For one thing, responsibility applies to actions, and one 
may quite reasonably balk at the idea that collectives act, as opposed to their individual 
members.  Actions, as opposed to mere movements, are usually distinguished by their 
connection with prior intentions, as well as beliefs and desires.  Does it make sense to 
attribute these sorts of states - intentional states - to collectives? 
 I think there are basically two ways to try to defend a notion of collective action: 
either attribute intentional states directly to collectives themselves, or introduce a 
secondary notion of action, applicable to collectives, that is derivative from the actions 
and intentional states of the individual members.  Tollefsen (2002) argues for the first 
strategy, utilizing Dennett’s (1971) view that attributions of intentional states are 
grounded by the utility of taking the “intentional stance” toward the subject in question - 
whether it be a person, a chess-playing computer, or, for that matter, a nation.  I don’t 
want to go this route because I don’t accept Dennett’s instrumentalist approach to 
attributions of intentional states.  On my view there are significant internal conditions, 
having to do with the semantically evaluable functional states of the organism that 
provide the truth-makers for intentional attributions.  Since these conditions are lacking 
in collectives, I don’t want to say that collectives genuinely instantiate intentional states. 
 However, it still seems to me to make sense to talk of collective actions.  When 
 
membership in a collective is also a difference.  None of the current theorists believe that 
liability to violent punishment follows from membership in a collective, except perhaps in cases 
  
                                                                                                                                                            
people explicitly coordinate their actions so as to carry out an action none of them on 
their own performed - or, as often is the case, could have performed - it makes sense to 
say that the group in question acted.  Of course the collective action is realized by the 
actions of the individual members, and it is only the members who instantiate the 
intentional states by virtue of which the group’s movements constitute actions - which 
actions then go to constitute the collective action.6 
 Now quite tightly coordinated individual actions and intentions, as manifested, 
say, by a gang robbing a bank, or a basketball team executing a fast break, seem like 
clear cases of the sort of collective action in question.  But I want to speak of nations 
acting, and clearly there isn’t anything like the degree of coordination or universal 
involvement on the part of the individual members as in the cases of a gang or a bank.  
Still, so long as there is a universally (or nearly so) recognized authority structure, so 
that it makes sense for individual members to consider that representatives, or leaders, 
are acting on their behalf in their capacity as members of the collective, I find the notion 
of collective action quite plausible.7 
 In particular, when nations are constituted by states, with recognized 
governments, the idea that they act as nations seems ineliminable if we are to make 
sense of international relations, including international law.  It is nations that invade, 
 
of genuine action in concert to achieve a sufficiently nefarious end; for example, conspiracy to 
murder.  More on this below. 
6I interpret Gilbert’s (2006) view that by virtue of joint commitments a group can act as a 
“plural subject” along the same lines. 
7Feinberg (1991), French (1991), and Gilbert (2006) all discuss ways that individuals can 
be implicated in the action of a collective when they fall short of the kind of tight connection 
displayed by the bank robbers or the basketball players. 
  
                                                
defend against invasion, maintain or break diplomatic relations, and all the rest.  When 
Nicaragua took the United States to the World Court over the latter’s sponsoring of the 
Contra war against it, it was the actions of the United States, as a nation, that were the 
object of its suit.8  If the United States had obeyed the ruling of the court, it would have 
been the government, as a representative of the people, that would have paid the 
required reparations.  Here we have a fairly clear case of collective action along with 
collective responsibility. 
 When we are not dealing with nation-states, but peoples in the looser sense, 
obviously it is harder to determine when the requirements for collective action are met.  I 
don’t have anything very specific to say about this, except to note that, on my view, 
there is a continuum of cases along the parameters of degree of organization, 
percentage of individuals jointly committed, and degree of individuals’ contributory 
actions, and the farther along this continuum one is the more applicable is the notion of 
collective action, and therefore also, collective responsibility. 
 What I do want to address, though, is how to understand the relation between 
collective responsibility, when it does apply, and the responsibility of the individuals 
comprising the collective.  In particular, to what degree does a doctrine of collective 
responsibility justify retributive harms suffered by the individual members of a collective 
when the collective has acted wrongly?  If we agree that bombing non-combatants 
cannot be justified in this way, how about lesser harms, like those involved in the 




responsibility can’t do the work of justifying such actions, are there other principles that 
can play the requisite role, thus providing a moral justification for actions that target 
collectives? 
3. Before addressing these particular questions, I want to explore another aspect of 
the issue of collective responsibility, one that will set us up to address these questions 
head on.  Tollefsen (2006) usefully distinguishes between “shared responsibility” and 
genuinely “collective responsibility.”  She criticizes both May (1991) and Gilbert for 
understanding collective responsibility in a way that distributes it over the individuals in 
the collective, hence the term “shared.”  On her view, the responsibility attaches to the 
collective as a whole, as a unit.  As it is the collective that acts, it is the collective that 
bears the responsibility for the action.  She doesn’t deny that individual responsibility 
may be implicated in the collective action due to the contributory actions of the 
individuals involved.  Her point is that any such individual responsibility is additional, 
and not, as it were, the material out of which the collective responsibility is composed. 
 Tollefsen’s insistence on the collective as the locus of responsibility makes good 
sense, I think, when applied to the issue with which she is concerned, namely the 
emotion of guilt.  Her point is that an individual can feel genuine guilt, and rationally so, 
over the wrongful actions of a collective of which she is a member, even though she 
feels no guilt (and shouldn’t) for anything she personally has done.  For instance, as an 
American Jew I can feel guilt over the Israeli attack on Gaza, and the American support 
for it, even though I acted to oppose the attack and in no way contributed to it.  I don’t 
fault myself, let’s assume (of course one always feels one could have done more, but 
  
that’s another matter).  I do fault the collectives in question.  And, what’s more, I do so 
qua member of the collective; hence guilt, rather than indignation alone, is the proper 
emotion to feel. 
 One might wonder what force this kind of collective guilt felt by an individual has 
if it isn’t taken by the individual to implicate her own moral worth.  Well, I think it does 
have real import.  If one rightfully feels collective guilt, then one also ought to feel a 
special sense of personal responsibility to do something to right the wrong in question, 
and to prevent similar wrongs from occurring in the future.9  Tollefsen’s notion of 
collective guilt makes sense of my feeling, as an American Jew, a special responsibility 
to work to end Israeli oppression of Palestinians, as well as, say, the U.S. occupations 
of Iraq and Afghanistan.  I don’t have to feel that I’m personally at fault for these 
outrages by the collectives in question - though I may be if I voted for the policies, or 
didn’t protest when I could have - in order to feel that, as a member, I have a special 
responsibility to do something about them.  Now, if I don’t in fact act on that special 
responsibility, then personal fault does emerge; but that is, again, additional to the 
collective guilt already felt.  
 Notice, though, that even if we take the collective itself to be the responsible 
agent, as Tollefsen urges, and don’t translate collective responsibility into shared 
responsibility, it is still clear that most of the action takes place on the level of the 
individual.  This is what one would predict given the position articulated above about the 
derivative nature of collective action.  What do I mean by all the action taking place at 
  
                                                                                                                                                            
the level of the individual?  Well, first of all, as Tollefsen acknowledges, while collective 
guilt is guilt on behalf of a collective, it is still felt by individuals.  The emotional content 
is collective, but the subject having the emotion is an individual. 
 But even more important, and what brings me to my main concern, is the fact 
that when retributive action is warranted in response to a collective wrong, the primary 
bearers of any harm inflicted are the individual members of the collective, not the 
collective itself.  I don’t want to deny that, just as collectives can be considered agents 
who act, it is possible that for certain purposes they can be said to have interests as 
well - interests that are not reducible to the interests of the individual members.  Where 
there are interests there are possibilities of thwarting those interests, and therefore a 
notion of collective harm - as distinct from shared, or distributed harm - might make 
sense. 
 But even if a notion of collective harm can be defended, it is clear that whenever 
collectives suffer retribution for their wrongs the principal burden is felt by individuals.  
Whether it be paying reparations, suffering economic sanctions, or being bombed, it is 
the individual members of the collective who must pay in the end.  Does participation in 
a collective warrant such treatment when the collective of which one is a member acts 
wrongly?  Frankly, I don’t see how it can.  As far as I can tell, only an appeal to the 
biblical morality discussed above can justify this transfer of collective guilt to individual 
moral liability to retributive harm. 
 My worry here is captured quite well in the following two quotes from 
 
9This seems to be how May (1991) understands the import of what he calls, following 
  
                                                                                                                                                            
philosophers who defend the coherence of the notion of collective responsibility: first, 
Joel Feinberg (2006) writes 
One would think that, where group fault is nondistributive, group liability must be 
so too, lest it fall vicariously on individual members who are faultless.  But, for all 
unfavorable responses, group liability is inevitably distributive: what harms the 
group as a whole necessarily harms its members (73).   
Along similar lines, Margaret Gilbert (2006) writes 
The same goes [i.e. she hasn’t dealt with this issue in the present paper] for a 
number of other moral concerns, including the question of how if at all non-
members are morally permitted or required to respond to a given collective’s 
blameworthiness.  Suffice it to say that given the model of such blameworthiness 
presented here, any steps directed against a blameworthy collective must be 
taken with extreme caution, on pain of harming numerous individuals who have 
little or nothing to answer for in connection with that collective’s action.  That is 
not to say that no such steps can ever be taken.  The moral propriety of any such 
steps, however, must always be carefully examined (114).    
It is precisely the “moral propriety of such steps” that I want to examine. 
 Another way to put the point about the problem of distributed harm involves Keith 
Graham’s (2006) distinction between “imposing” and “embracing” collective 
responsibility.  The idea that as a member of a collective I can rightfully feel guilt over 
the collective’s action grounds my personally embracing responsibility for the action, 
 
Jaspers (1947), “metaphysical guilt,” or “moral taint.” 
  
and for addressing its consequences to the extent I can.  But this does not automatically 
justify others in imposing burdens or harms on me by virtue of my membership in the 
collective.  For this we need further justification, to which I now turn. 
4. I want now to discuss the question of actions, such as economic sanctions, that 
are aimed at addressing wrongful collective actions, but have inevitable harmful 
consequences for the individual members of the collective.  I supported the economic 
boycott of South Africa during the apartheid era, and I support the imposition of 
sanctions against Israel, and Israeli companies, in order to secure its withdrawal from 
the occupied territories and to pressure it to cease its violations of Palestinian civil, 
political, and human rights.  However, I do not believe it’s true that all South Africans 
were guilty of contributing to apartheid, nor do I think all Israelis are guilty either.  Given 
the remarks above about the unjustifiability in most circumstances of imposing collective 
responsibility, how can such actions against collectives be justified? 
 In what follows I will explore the prospects for providing a combination social 
contract-utilitarian justification for imposing burdens on individuals who comprise a 
collective that acts wrongly.  In particular, my focus will be on the justifiability of 
economic sanctions and boycotts as instruments of pressure on national groups.  The 
kind of justificatory basis I will outline is individualistic; it does not rely on any of the 
claims about collective agents and actions discussed above.  For, as emphasized at the 
end of section 3, I see no way to justify the imposition of burdens or harms on 
individuals purely by virtue of their connection to the relevant collective.  If an individual 
is to suffer for an action, it must be justifiable to that individual either as retribution for 
  
what that individual has done (or failed to do), or on utilitarian considerations that apply 
to all individuals.  On pain of falling into the biblical conception of collective 
responsibility, I see no other way to proceed. 
 Let’s assume that, at least for citizens of developed industrial states, that 
everyone’s interest is served by the existence of a legal system that recognizes certain 
collectives as legal agents.  When one such collective is deemed at fault in some way - 
say a judgment against a nation by the International Court of Justice - and required to 
make restitution, to what extent, if any, does this obligation morally devolve upon the 
individual persons constituting this collective?  If we have an answer to this question, we 
might then be well on our way to providing an account of the moral basis for pressure 
tactics involving boycotts. 
 While I do think these two issues are connected, there are further distinctions to 
make here.  To begin with, there is a longstanding issue in political philosophy - one 
might say it is the issue in political philosophy - concerning the moral basis for the 
authority of the state.  Taking the autonomy of individual agents as the, or at least a, 
fundamental moral notion, the question immediately arises how the state, or its 
representatives, have the right to coerce individual citizens.  Of course this is a very 
complex topic, but let me say that on this issue I favor some sort of social contract 
theory.  Somehow, whether through a Rawlsian Original Position, or some more 
concrete idea of an implicit contract, citizens of a state, by virtue of their benefiting from 
the terms of cooperation constitutive of the state, acquire obligations to obey the laws of 
the state.  (This is not to deny that morally exigent circumstances can legitimate civil 
  
disobedience, or even violent resistance.  But that’s another matter.)  
 Suppose then that we grant that individuals, through their participation in the 
social contract, acquire individual obligations to obey the laws of the state.  This means 
that when they break the law they incur liability to retribution.  If we accept this much, 
then it doesn’t seem much of a stretch to argue that part of what individuals agree to is 
to assume their share of the collective responsibility that the laws of their state - and, 
thereby, the treaties and agreements into which their state enters - assign to the 
organizations, including the state itself, of which they are members.  Therefore, if the 
International Court of Justice, say, determines that the United States owes reparations 
to Nicaragua for the damage caused by the “contra” war, an individual taxpayer, though 
not a party to the evil deeds in question, still bears her share of this financial 
responsibility.  This can be thought of as a kind of collective responsibility if one wants 
to apply the term here, but it is really a matter of the individual responsibility a citizen 
bears through her participation in the social contract founding the state. 
 While I think these social contract considerations move us some way toward 
accounting for whatever collective responsibility there is, I don’t think they suffice.  For 
one thing, some accommodation must be made for the fact that most governments - our 
own, and other industrial democracies, included, but especially authoritarian 
governments - do not really keep their part of the social bargain, and hence there must 
be a corresponding diminution on ordinary citizens’ responsibility for the actions of their 
governments.  For instance, in several countries of South America during the 1970's 
and early 1980's, the governments in power were brutal military regimes.  Aside from 
  
                                                
their repressive policies, they also ran up enormous debts to international banks, debts 
that were inherited by the democratic regimes that replaced them after the generals 
were deposed.10   I think there is a strong case to be made that, morally speaking, the 
populations of these countries, already impoverished and devastated by the years of 
junta rule, were not responsible to pay these debts.  Now this is an extreme case, and 
arguably no social contract applied here.  But it seems to me that even in less extreme 
cases, indeed in democracies like ours, the government is sufficiently independent of 
the control of the vast majority of its citizens that it’s not clear they really share, by virtue 
of social contract considerations alone, in the responsibility for its actions.  Some other 
basis for boycotts and reparation payments must be found.   
 I think there are two such bases, and they both admit of degrees of responsibility.  
First, among the citizens of a nation - whether it be democratic or authoritarian - some 
benefit more from the policies of the government than others, and some have the 
opportunity to exert more influence over its policies than others.  Usually these two 
factors coincide.  It seems plausible that the degree of one’s individual responsibility for 
a policy carried out by another agent is correlated with both how much one benefits 
from it and how much influence one has over it.  In a democracy, with freedom of 
speech, individual citizens can exercise their rights to protest actions of their 
government they deem immoral.  If they don’t choose to exercise that right, or fail to 
make the right moral judgment concerning the policy which they could have protested, 
it’s plausible that they bear some personal responsibility for the policy.  It’s also 
 
10 For a detailed account of what happened in these countries, see Klein (2007).   
  
                                                
plausible that the more they benefit from the immoral policy, and don’t protest it, or act 
to impede it, the more responsibility they bear.11 
 Thus reparation payments and boycotts should be formulated in ways that the 
burden incurred by them falls as much as possible on those who both benefited, or 
continue to benefit most from the immoral actions, and are (or were) best in a position to 
do something about it.  Given the situation of Palestinians in Gaza, it is hard to hold 
most of them at all responsible for whatever wrongful actions taken by Hamas militants 
and leaders, while Jewish citizens of Israel have more means and freedom to oppose 
their government’s policy.  But my point is that even with respect to Israeli citizens there 
are distinctions to be made, and justice requires attempting to frame pressure tactics in 
a way that respects the principle just articulated.  It may only make sense to pressure or 
punish those who benefit most (such as arms dealers) and can do the most about it.   
 So far I’ve come up with two ways that what is on the surface a kind of collective 
retribution is really a matter of individual responsibility: social contract considerations 
and benefit/ability to influence considerations.  The ability to influence consideration as 
applied to a citizen with respect to the actions of her government is related to the 
responsibility we would naturally ascribe to a parent who knowingly allows their child to 
play with a gun.  (In fact, the analogy is all too close I’m afraid.)  Now, a basic constraint 
on retributive justice is proportionality.  The punishment should fit the crime.  I contend 
that the kind of individual responsibility for criminal actions by a government borne by 
 
11The idea that one’s share in collective responsibility is proportional to how much one 
benefits from the collective’s actions as well as how much influence one is able to exert is 
emphasized by both Feinberg (1991) and McGary (1991), though they differ on specifics. 
  
                                                
ordinary citizens almost never justifies violent or drastic economic sanctions (such as 
those imposed on Iraq by the United Nations, mostly because of United States 
pressure, in the 1990's).  Some degree of discomfort seems appropriate - and I can’t 
say precisely how much of course - but death or maiming by bombing, whether from the 
air or by suicide bombers, or economic sanctions that reduce people to starvation or 
severely degrade their standard of living, seems clearly disproportionate to the level of 
responsibility at issue here.  Attention to proportionality, together with attention to 
degree of responsibility, I believe suffices to distinguish the immorality of the Israeli 
assault on Gaza, including the prior economic blockade, from the morally permissible 
use of targeted economic sanctions against Israel to pressure them to end their 
occupation of Palestinian land. 
 However, we’re not done with this topic quite yet.  There is still a problem.  While 
social contract and benefit-and-ability-to-influence considerations do provide a basis for 
distinguishing cases like that of Gaza and Israel, they aren’t quite enough to provide a 
general justification for economic sanctions, or any other sort of boycott.12  Sanctions 
are a somewhat blunt instrument.  It is obviously foolish to believe that one can fashion 
a sanctions regime that harms every individual member of the targeted group only to the 
extent of their individual responsibility.  There is just no way of knowing that the amount 
of discomfort experienced by each and every individual affected by one’s pressure tactic 
 
12 I have in mind here academic and cultural boycotts.  Some people have quite specific 
objections to boycotts of this sort that don’t have to do with the question of collective 
punishment, but more to do with the value of free speech.  Since that’s another topic entirely, I 
will ignore it in what follows. 
 
  
against a nation or a large business is what they deserve and no more.  Let us call that 
portion of the disutility caused by a tactic like economic sanctions, whether by affecting 
totally innocent individuals or by affecting appropriate individuals but by too much, the 
degree of “innocent victimization.”  It seems to me that any policy of sanctions and/or 
boycotts will cause a certain amount of innocent victimization.  If so, it looks like the kind 
of considerations developed above can’t serve to justify it.  
 If we acknowledge that any action against a collective like economic sanctions 
will entail some amount of innocent victimization, and nevertheless believe that such 
tactics are both justifiable, and even necessary, maybe one can justify such actions by 
squeezing a little more out of the social contract idea.  Here’s the way you might look at 
it.  Part of the social contract, the one that covers global issues, is that one allows 
oneself to be victimized (in this technical sense) in return for the right to victimize others, 
all for the overall common good.  I’m actually sympathetic to working this out along 
Rawlsian, “original position” lines, though I’m in no position to do that now.   But even if 
one could make such an argument, one would first have to make the utilitarian case that 
it really was for the overall common good.  So therefore I’m inclined to just rely at this 
point - when accounting for innocent victimization by economic sanctions - on the 
utilitarian considerations alone. 
 Here’s the idea.  No matter how strict a Kantian one is (okay, not Kant himself), 
one has to acknowledge always the possibility of rights and rules being swamped by 
utilitarian considerations.  It’s a pretty secure principle that one should never torture 
innocent babies, but describe a scenario where billions of lives depend on it, who 
  
                                                
wouldn’t say that the right thing to do is torture the baby?  (Of course it’s estimated 
utility that matters, so you have to be awfully sure.  Let’s just stipulate that you are.)  
Size matters when it comes to suffering, and there is always, or almost always, a level 
that can overpower other moral principles and rights. (I am not going to argue for this 
here, but I assume it’s a widely shared basic intuition.)  This is why I don’t see how one 
can argue that terrorism, as a method of accomplishing a worthy goal, is absolutely 
never permissible.  If the Jews could have saved themselves from the Holocaust by 
blowing up Hitler, but to do that they would have to take 100 children with him, does 
anyone think it’s clear that they wouldn’t have been right in doing so?  Fortunately, I 
think it never in practice comes down to that, so I can feel pretty confident in, practically 
speaking, opposing terrorism universally.  But those who self-righteously take that stand 
must be prepared to make the nitty-gritty case to those who argue that the harm being 
avoided by terrorist attacks is so significant that it justifies such attacks.13  
 Be that as it may, when dealing with the much more benign tactic of limited 
economic sanctions, I don’t think the suffering bar is quite that high.  So when the 
interest which the economic sanctions are meant to protect or enhance is significant 
enough, innocent victimization can be justified on utilitarian grounds.  Of course, as with 
“double effect” (a different doctrine, but one that applies to cases of innocent 
victimization), all the right sorts of constraints need to be enforced (except the one 
about deliberate targeting, which applies only to double effect). One must do what one 
 
13Relevant to this is the doctrine of “dirty hands,” the idea that what must do something that is 
still considered morally impermissible.  For my purposes the distinction between having dirty 
hands and doing what, overall is the right thing, doesn’t matter.  See Walzer (1973). 
  
                                                                                                                                                            
can to minimize the level of innocent victimization, and there needs to be a compelling 
trade off from a utilitarian point of view.  Notice, as mentioned above, utilitarian 
comparisons deal with estimated utilities, which is all we have to go on.  So we need to 
be sure, when engaging in a policy of economic sanctions that entails a certain level of 
innocent victimization, both that the harm we’re trying to avoid, or ameliorate, is 
extremely likely and very serious, and also that there is a sufficient ground for believing 
that the tactic will work to avoid or ameliorate that harm.  The higher the level of 
innocent victimization, the higher the level of confidence about success one requires, all 
other things equal.14  
 In this section I’ve argued as follows.  Strictly speaking, there is no imposed 
collective responsibility in the following sense: no individual morally deserves retribution 
for actions done by another merely by virtue of their membership in the same collective 
as the agent whose action incurs the blame in question.  Some level of disutility is, 
however, permissible to cause to members of a collective both on the grounds that they 
bear some personal responsibility for the actions in question (for the social contract and 
benefit-and-ability-to-influence considerations described above), and also because 
there is a sufficiently compelling utilitarian calculation to “soak up,” as it were, the 
residual suffering not covered by the personal responsibility; that is, the amount of 
suffering categorized as innocent victimization.   
 
 




 Notice that the justification for retributive actions against collectives requires all 
the factors mentioned above: social contract considerations, benefit-and-ability-to-
influence considerations, and pure utilitarian considerations.  One might think that once 
one brings in the idea of allowing compelling utilitarian calculations to intrude, why 
bother with the rest?  But just how compelling the utilitarian advantage has to be is 
determined not by the overall level of suffering imposed, but by the level of innocent 
victimization.  The more responsible the parties, the less compelling the utilitarian 
consideration has to be.  When it comes to people who actually order and carry out 
atrocities, innocent victimization is not an issue, and we don’t have to worry about the 
utilitarian calculation. 
5. In this paper I’ve argued that there is a legitimate notion of collective 
responsibility in the sense that collectives genuinely act and therefore can be held 
responsible for those actions.  When they are held responsible, however, the 
consequences entailed fall on their individual members.  While it is right for individual 
members to identify with the collective action, given that they freely associate 
themselves with the collective, and therefore to embrace a personal responsibility for 
compensating victims of wrongful collective actions and seeking to prevent further 
wrongs, membership in the collective per se does not justify others in imposing burdens 
or harms on individual members.  For that we must appeal to principles that govern 
individual morality, such as social contract and utilitarian considerations.  Using such 
principles, I believe, warrants the kinds of actions we need to regulate the behavior of 
national collectives, but without justifying the kinds of outrageous acts, such as the 
  
bombing of Gaza, that appeal to the notion of collective responsibility can seem to 
legitimate. 
Joseph Levine  
University of Massachusetts, Amherst  
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